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Theories of regulation are discussed and compared.  Some important issues relating to 
regulation as a substitute for research in creating theory as discussed. 
 
 
Over the years there have been many arguments and debates over the necessity for 
regulation. Those who believe in the efficacy of markets argue that regulation is not 
necessary as market forces will operate to best serve society and optimise the allocation 
of resources. However, there are many who point out that markets do not always operate 
in the best interests of societies so some form of intervention in the form of regulation is 
necessary. This is obvious in many aspects of society. For example, if there were no road 
rules for drivers chaos would result on the roads. If there were no restrictions on some 
“economic” activities then there would not be any need of drug smugglers as the market 
would indicate the need (demand) for drugs which would subsequently be supplied. 
These are obviously extreme examples but it is not hard to realise that there are many 
instances were regulations protect societies from undesirable activities.  
 
In 19th century Britain there was considerable optimism over the benefits brought by the 
Industrial Revolution and it was deemed undesirable for governments to “interfere” with 
the operation of “pure capitalism”. Governments, therefore, pursued a policy of what was 
known as laissez-faire (from the French “let be”, or leave alone). However, people soon 
came to realise that this created many social ills and some of these are reflected in the 
novels of Charles Dickens, such as Oliver Twist, and the writings and work of other 
artists and social commentators. Working conditions were often dangerous and 
inhumane, such as making use of child labour and extraordinarily long working hours 
which led to considerable poverty and misery. Governments soon intervened and 
imposed the regulations on economic activity that were considered socially desirable. 
 
The issue of the regulation of accounting also became an issue, especially after the 
economic crash of the 1920-30s which, amongst other things, led to the search for 
accounting principles and theory described. A major objective of accounting is to provide 
information to interested parties who may not have access to complete (or the necessary) 
information to make economic decisions – they are at an information disadvantage so 
there is information asymmetry. This information asymmetry is often used to justify the 
need for accounting regulation. However, the regulation extends well beyond the 
information to the preparers of information. That is, the professional competence of those 
calling themselves accountants or auditors and generally believed to be the most able to 
provide and/or supervise the provision of financial information.  
 
Accounting and accountants are now subject to wide range of forms of regulation. There 
are laws governing the operation of corporations many of which involve the disclosure of 
financial information. In addition, there are taxation laws and laws affecting the creation 
and operation of professional associations, which, in turn impose regulations on their 
members. Regulations, therefore, are very much part of modern everyday life. However, 
there is disagreement on the extent to which regulation should intervene in the “free” 
exchange of goods and ideas. For example, a believer in a strong form of market 
efficiency would contend that regulation of securities markets is unnecessary as the 
market is always instantly informed of all relevant information. However, most people 
would agree that there are few, if any, instances of strongly efficient markets so some 
level of regulation of the flow of information concerning the operations of securities (and 
other) markets is necessary. 
 
The above discussion of regulation is, however, simplified as any debate on the extent to 
which government should be involved in the day to day operation of society is extremely 
complex and has been the subject of debate by many scholars (and others) for most of our 
history. Underlying regulation are theories of the state, politics and ideology. For 
example, we talk of liberal democracies as an ideal form of society. However, liberalism 
is a doctrine or ideology which emphasises the maximisation of individual liberties 
against the encroachment of the state. This invokes questions of the determination of just 
what individual freedoms mean and has implications of power – who decides what 
freedoms are possible. 
 
Views of Regulation 
 
While many would see regulation as concerning “sustained and focused control exercised 
by a public agency over activities valued by a community” (Selznick quoted in Baldwin 
and Cave, 1999, p 2), there are other viewpoints. Regulation can be seen as a specific set 
of commands such as those contained in the Corporations Act as to the appointment of 
directors of a company. It may be seen as deliberate state influence which would 
encompass the first viewpoint and extend well beyond it. For example, the whole body of 
corporations law which directs the establishment, management and winding up of 
companies. Or it may be viewed in even broader terms and include all forms of social 
control and influence. This would include not only the corporations legislative 
requirements but other rules and directions, such as professional accounting standards 
and stock exchange requirements. Regulation should not be perceived purely in 
“negative” terms because it also facilitates and enables activities. For example, the road 
rules mentioned above are designed to enable people to feel secure in driving knowing 
that there are rules that other drivers will (should?) follow. 
 
Reasons for Regulation 
 
Baldwin and Cave (1999 argue that there are a number of reasons for regulation. One of 
the best known form of regulation was exercised by US government over the potential 
growth of monopolies at the turn of the twentieth century – the anti-trust legislation (for 
example the Sherman and the Clayton Acts). Where monopolies exist it is considered that 
there has been a market failure because competition does not exist. Therefore, it can be 
inferred from this that regulation is associated with preserving competition. Thus, it is 
associated with the ideology of the efficacy of markets and competition, hallmarks of 
capitalism. In centrally controlled economies many “monopolies” are created (usually as 
some form of bureaucratic control). However, in other countries it is generally believed 
that it is necessary to maintain an environment conducive to competition. In Australia the 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) is charged to ensure 
competitiveness and rule against anti-competitive behaviour (ensuring compliance with 
the Trade Practices Act, 1974). Sometimes “natural” monopolies” arise where there are 
economies of scale that ensure the market is served at the least cost (for example, many 
utilities such as water, gas or electricity suppliers) in which case regulation is designed to 
maintain fair trading. 
 
Regulation is considered desirable where there are “windfall profits” – where through 
some fortuitous event a firm is able to make above “normal” profits. For example, 
suppliers of equipment to aid search and recovery where there has been a natural disaster 
(which seems to be happening more regularly these days!). Because of the urgent need – 
the immediate demand – suppliers may attempt to charge higher than normal prices and 
thus generate above normal profits. Similarly, in the past many costs that are related to 
certain productive activities were excluded such that the “true” cost was not recognised. 
These costs were defined as externalities because they were not included. Of particular 
relevance in recent times are the costs of avoiding pollution, for example, discharge into 
the river system the cost for which had to be borne by societies at large. In any discussion 
of environmental or social responsibility accounting externalities are of considerable 
importance. 
 
A significant problem that was central to much of the neo-empirical and positive 
accounting research is the need for regulation arising from information inadequacies 
leading to information asymmetries. Such research was directed at determining the 
possible need for regulation in the form of accounting standards to address the problem.  
 
Regulation is sometimes necessary to ensure that “profit skimming” does not occur. This 
is when a supplier will only supply the customers that leads to the greatest profit returns 
and ignore supply to others. This is the central issue in respect of the privatisation of 
Telecom Australia. The government has to ensure that telecommunication services 
continue to be provided as equally and fairly as possible to all Australians irrespective of 
where they live; rural or urban. This case, however, is not an isolated instance and there 
are many other less widely known similar cases where regulation is used to ensure 
continuity and availability of service on an equitable basis. Similarly where there is seen 
to be anti-competitive and predatory pricing regulation is used as a preventative measure 
and outlaws such activities. Microsoft was accused of this type of behaviour (source 
codes for the windows platform) in the USA and the government brought law suits to 
overcome it. 
 
From the perspective of consumers there are instance of what is colloquially known as 
the free rider effect. This is the situation where some consumers benefit from a service 
without paying for it at the expense of other consumer who do pay for the service. A 
physical example is where a business opens next to a large public car park and therefore 
avoids the cost of providing car parking to potential customers. This may serve as a 
disincentive for the producers of the service so governments will intervene and levy a tax 
on the service. However, the term is often used in the context of securities markets in 
respect of the amount of disclosure of financial information a firm must make. If 
regulations insist on a high level of disclosure, it is argued, some parties will benefit from 
the disclosure without having to bear the cost of providing the information. A similar 
situation is referred to as moral hazard where consumers not paying for a service or 
product over-consume without regard to the costs being borne by others. This is a 
problem in the insurance industry where it is often claimed that some people make 
excessive claims against their policies whilst others make few or no claims. Insurance is 
based on the idea of pooling the costs of bearing risk such that all participants benefit so 
when some make excessive claims they may be benefiting more than others1. 
 
Regulation is also necessary in the rationalisation and coordination of economic activity 
so as to organise behaviour or industries in an efficient manner. An example is the 
marketing of many primary products through a central marketing agency, such as the 
wool board or the marketing of fish or meat. There is similar reasoning where some 
central planning is necessary. Once again this is important when considering 
environmental impacts of activities where some people are required to bear more costs 
than others. In order to have an equitable outcome regulation can be designed to balance 
the costs borne by different sectors. For example, preserving forests may lead to timber 
sectors bearing a cost of a loss of jobs or firm closures so regulation is needed to ensure a 
fair and equitable outcome in that such costs are borne by the broader society (which 
benefits from the preservation of the forests). 
 
A not so obvious need for regulation arises in labour markets. This is a highly politically 
charged situation. For example, the ideology of a government may want to limit 
membership of unions to reduce the bargaining power of labour providers so it bans 
compulsory unionism. This is seen by some as directly reducing the bargaining power of 
workers which directly affects their wages and conditions (including their health and 
safety). 
 
In some countries there are or have been shortages of some goods and services so that 
rationing (limits to the amount of goods or service permitted to be purchase by each 
consumer) has been necessary. In these situations it has been believed that regulations 
rather than market forces enable a more just distribution. For example, a shortage of 
petrol could disadvantage those furthest from its supply (say rural consumers). A purely 
market driven reaction by suppliers would be to minimise transport costs and sell to those 
nearer the production in the confidence that all of the product will be sold anyway (very 
similar to profit skimming). Regulation can be used to ensures that there is a fairer 
distribution of petrol. 
 
The above are some reasons for the necessity of regulation. In reality there may be a 
combination of many of the above reasons that leads to regulation. As indicated, 
regulation can be negative in that it prevents or restricts some behaviour or it may be 
positive in that it serves to encourage or facilitate activity. 
 
                                                 
1 But ther is always the possibility that they are suffering more than others! 
Theorising Regulation 
 
Throughout history there have been two main approaches to regulation – the European 
and that of the United States of America – each based on a different philosophy (perhaps 
more accurately different ideologies) of the need for regulation. In the US, at least since 
1887, regulation has been achieved through independent boards and/or commissions 
charged to monitor and enforce regulation. There is an implicit belief in the functioning 
of the market. Consequently, ownership is left in private hands and “is interfered with 
only in specific cases of market failure” (Majone, 1996. p 10).  
 
On the other hand in Europe up until the Second World War there was a suspicion and 
even hostility to the idea of the market solving all problems. Consequently, public 
ownership was the main mode of economic regulation – industries were nationalised. The 
resultant public ownership of industries “was supposed to give the state the power to 
impose a planned structure on the economy and to protect the public interest against 
powerful private interests” (Majone, 1996. p 11). However, the nationalisation of 
industries was designed not only to eliminate political power and the economic 
inefficiency of private monopolies but also to stimulate economic development. 
However, in the last fifty years, for a variety of reasons, attitudes in Europe have shifted 
more to the US approach – public ownership as a mode of regulation was seen to have 
failed. Interestingly regulation has not always achieved its stated aims and Majone (1996, 
pp 17-19) has compared the two approaches and found a remarkably high level of 
correspondence, that is, both have “failed’ in remarkably similar ways! Notwithstanding 
this, there have been advantages from regulation. 
 
Initially the main advantage claimed for regulation was the protection of the public 
interest. This applied in both modes of regulation – statutory regulation or public 
ownership. Regulation was believed to protect against market failure. Markets “failed” 
when they were not economically efficient. The notion of efficiency was formalised by 
an Italian economist and sociologist, Vilfredo Pareto, after which the concept is named. 
Pareto efficiency (sometime wrongly referred to as Pareto optimality) is used by 
economists to define the efficient organisation of the economy. Pareto efficiency refers to 
the allocation of resources such that someone can be made better off while no one else is 
made worse off. Hence there has been an efficient means of production and distribution 
of resources. When this does not happen, there has been market failure. This notion 
underlies neo-classical economics and is an important consideration in understanding the 
notion of economic regulation which is the topic of consideration here. 
 
A distinction is made by many people between positive accounting theory (PAT) and 
what they call normative accounting theory. PAT emerges from positive economics. In 
discussing market failure and regulation a similar distinction is made by some. That is, 
there are analyses of regulation which are derived from positive economics and some 
from normative assumptions. These are described as theories of regulation. All can be 
viewed as some type of interest theory – primarily public or private but with “in-
between” types. 
 
Public Interest Theories 
Advocates of the public interest theories of regulation see its purpose as achieving certain 
publicly desired results which, if left to the market, would not be obtained. The regulation 
is provided in response to the demand from the public for corrections to inefficient and 
inequitable markets. Thus, regulation is pursued for public, as opposed to private, interest 
related objectives. This was the dominant view of regulation until the 1960s and still 
retains many adherents. It is generally felt that determining what is the public interest is a 
normative question and advocates of positive theorising would, therefore, object to this 
approach on the basis that they believe it is not possible to determine objective aims for 
regulation; there is no basis for objectively identifying the public interest. 
 
There are other charges laid at the feet of the public interest approach. These include 
attention being directed to the regulators themselves. Is it possible for them to act in a 
disinterested manner? Are they sufficiently competent? As might be expected such critics 
suggest there may be questions of the reward structure for regulators (being insufficient), 
their career structure and training may be inadequate. In addition it is often argued that 
the public interest approach underestimates the effects of economic and political power 
influences on regulation. 
 
Interest Group Theories 
An extension of the public interest theory is the interest group theory approach. Thus, 
regulation is viewed as the products of relationships between different groups and 
between such groups and the state. Advocates differ from public interest theorists in that 
they believe regulation is more competition for power rather than solely for the public 
interest. Baldwin and Cave (1999, p 21) suggest a range of interest group theories from 
open minded pluralism to corporatism. The former see competing groups struggling for 
political power with the winners using their power to shape the form of regulation. On the 
other hand, corporatists emphasise the extent to which successful groups enter into 
partnership with the state to produce “regulatory regimes that exclude non-participating 
interests” (p 21). 
 
The Economic Theory of Regulation 
The public interest theory of regulation is regarded as responding to a weakly defined 
demand for regulation. The positive or economic theory of regulation was introduced by 
Stigler in an article in 1971 It was later extended by one of his students, Peltzman, and 
has greatly influenced thinking on regulation theories. With many slight variations in 
interpretation this type of theory goes under a variety of names:  
Economic theory,  
Private interest theory, 
Capture theory,  
Special interest theory, 
Public choice theory,  
and probably many more. 
 
Emerging from Chicago it is seen as a positive (economic) theory in which Stigler 
attempted to provide a theoretical foundation for an earlier notion of political theory that 
regulatory agencies are captured by producers. As a positive theory it assumes that 
regulators (political actors) are utility maximisers. Although the utility is not specified it 
would seem to mean securing and maintaining political power (Majone, 1996, p 31). In 
order to do this they need votes and money, resources able to be provided by groups 
positively affected by regulatory decisions. Thus, the regulators have been “captured” by 
such (special) interest groups who “seek to expropriate wealth or income. Income may 
take various forms, including a direct subsidy of money, restrictions on the entry to an 
industry of new rivals, suppression of substitute and competitive products, 
encouragement of complementary products, and price fixing” (Stigler, 1971, pp 3-7) 
 
This approach to regulation is consistent with public choice theory which stresses the 
extent to which governmental behaviour is understood by envisioning all actors as 
rational individual maximisers of their own welfare. Analysis is directed to the competing 
preferences of the individuals involved – how they get around regulatory goals in order to 
further their own goals. Consequently private interests are served rather than the public 
interest. Public choice theory reconciles political and economic questions. It relies on the 
neo-classical economic assumption of rational choice (self interest) to predict the 
behaviour of politicians (the regulators) – politicians only enact those policies that ensure 
their re-election which, as described above, will direct them to those with the resources to 
further this aim. 
 
The economic theory approach to regulation has encountered many problems for which it 
has been unable to provide solutions. When a theory meets problems for which it has not 
response, theorists add “extensions” or ad hoc hyptheses in an attempt to save the 
underlying theory. For example, Stigler’s theory did not explain the phenomena of cross-
subsidisation – where the economic benefits of regulation extend from the intended group 
to other groups of producers and consumers. His student, Pelztman attempted to extend 
the original analysis but he also failed to provide convincing conclusions to critics. 
However, another Chicago colleague, Gary Becker did reach a more acceptable 
explanation but he did so by combining elements of positive and normative theories, or, 
the economic theory and the public interest theory!2  Another major problem of economic 
theories is that they are unable to explain regulation – that is, there is no converse of their 
explanation for regulation. 
 
Majone (1996) concludes that “positive and normative theories of regulation should be 
viewed as complementary rather that mutually exclusive” (1996, p 34). However, neither 
include an explanation for the institutional framework of regulation. Institutions were 
regarded as “black boxes” from which regulation emerged. 
 
                                                 
2 See Majone (1996, pp 32-34) for a fuller explanation. Baldwin and Cave (1999, pp 24-25) describe other 
instances such as the work of Bernstein’s “life-cycle” theory which, interestingly, also encompasses both 
economic and public interest theories. 
Institutional Theories 
 
A group of regulation theorists who reject the rational actor model have argued that the 
institutional structure and arrangements as well as the social processes shape regulation 
and therefore need to be understood. There is much more than individuals’ preferences 
that drive regulation and that is the organisational and social setting from which the 
regulation emerges. 
Regulation is thus seen as shaped not so much by notions of the public 
interest or competitive bargaining between different private interests but 
by institutional arrangements and rule (legal and other). (Baldwin & 
Cave, 1996, p 27) 
 
Institutional theorists (often called new institutionalists3) come from a wide variety of 
disciplines with a wide range of political and social predilections but all share a disbelief 
in atomistic accounts of regulation, that is, those explanations that focus on the 
individual. One form of institutional theory in the socio-legal literature draws on agency 
theory. The principals are the elected officials who then have to ensure that their 
“agents”, the bureaucrats, design regulations that preserve the thrust of the original policy 
position. That is, that there is no bureaucratic drift. As with the agency theory in PAT, 
there is an information asymmetry in favour of the agents so the elected officials need to 
first design procedures that reduce the informational disadvantages faced by the 
politicians and, second, (so they can) ensure there are sufficient “dependable” 
administrators involved in the design of the regulation (cf Baldwin and Cave, 1996, p 28 
who describe the work on this undertaken by McCubbins, Noll and Weingast; or see 
Majone, 1999, pp 35-37, for a discussion of other agency approaches to institutional 
theories of regulation and some of the difficulties involved)4. 
 
Institutional theorists in political science have concentrated on the way that “political 
structures, institutions, and decision-making processes shape political outcomes” 
(Baldwin and Cave, p 29). Institutional organisational theorists have focussed on 
organisational structures and processes. Yet other institutional theorists question the 
assumption of conflict between public authorities and private interests (such as the 
agency theorists believe) and concentrate on the interrelation between public and private 
interests and the ever-changing character of these relationships. 
 
The Political-Economic Theories 
 
Most, but not all, of the above theoretical approaches have had a tacit assumption of a 
capitalist system based, sometimes loosely, on a neo-classical economics. There are some 
“radical” theories which reject the neo-classical assumption and some of these are 
discussed by Tinker (1984). Capitalism is a social system in which there is interplay 
between the political and economic realms.  In neo-classical theory it is assumed that the 
                                                 
3 They are referred to as new institutionalists  to distinguish them from the institutional economists of the 
early twentieth century (eg Veblen) 
4 A very popular television program in the 1980s and 1990, Yes Minister, illustrated the difficult 
relationship between the politician and the bureaucrat. 
political realm is shaped by economic interests. Employing the work of Lindblom, Tinker 
argues that there are many social inequalities among social classes which arise from the 
degree of access to and use of property and reliance on the market place. Regulation is 
necessary to move towards balancing some of the inequalities and, in effect, ensure the 
survival of capitalism. Such regulation serves “to protect the general or collective 
interests of capital and the requirements of the capital accumulation process” (Tinker, p 
66). Tinker contends that the neo-classical economic framework is inadequate to 
characterise the need for regulation. Such economics is reductionist in that its advocates 
hold it is universalistic – it applies in all places at al times. However, Tinker, claims, 
there are many other social factors that need to be included in any analysis of regulation. 
 
The analysis of regulation by Puxty et al (1987) can also be labelled as taking a political-
economic approach although it is different from Tinkers. Their approach is more 
specifically directed to the how and why of accounting regulation and they discuss this in 
respect of four countries, viz, the then Federal Republic of Germany, the UK, Sweden 
and the USA, all which are described as advanced capitalist countries. Despite the 
similarities in the countries discussed they note that regulation will be shaped “according 
to the contrasting histories, cultures and paths of development of different nation states” 
(p 275). Thus, there analysis also rejects the reductionism of the neo-classical economic 
approaches. They build their argument from the work of Streeck and Schmitter who see 
that regulation emerges from the interplay of the three principles of social order – market, 
state and community. The original authors’ analysis sees regulation as part of a 
“composite order in which (there is) a delicate balance between three formally 
incompatible, yet substantially interdependent, guiding principles of coordination and 
allocation” (p 277). Therefore, what is important to note is that regulation is viewed as 
going much beyond the purely economic (as in the neo-classical approaches) and will 
reflect broader cultural and societal values. 
 
It is very important to understand the different approaches to regulation. Traditionally, 
discussions of regulation in accounting texts have merely mentioned the private and 
public interests theories in the context of accounting standards.  However, regulation 
extends well beyond standard setting and has implication for how professions are 
organised, how they operate and what broader social expectation there of them. For 
example, the nature of the regulatory framework will affect perceptions of social 
responsibilities and ethical behaviour. There are many more implications of regulation 
than discussed above. There are implications of power and dominant ideologies that 
shape that power and consequent economic activity within a society. For example, what 
are the societal expectations of the governance of the major institutions of economic 
activity – corporations? Why are there spectacular corporate failures? How is it that 




The right choice of regulatory strategies by regulators will avoid debates over the need 
for the regulation if the relevant objectives could be achieved in ways other than the 
particular regulation. Thus, there are a number of basic strategies that regulators may 
employ and Baldwin and Cave (1996) describe several. These include: 
 
Command and control 
This is where regulators take a clear stand as to what activities are considered acceptable 
and what not with strictly enforced and severe penalties imposed on the latter. Examples 
would include work and safety regulations with which businesses must comply – strict 
standards are imposed. There are some issues with this regulatory strategy. First, it has 
been shown that because a close relation between the regulator and the regulated 
develops the regulators may be captured by the regulated. Walker (1987) has suggested 
this is what happened in the case of the early development of the Australian Accounting 
Standards Review Board. Secondly, this strategy often leads to overly strict and inflexible 
and even a proliferation of rules. Thirdly, it is often extremely difficult to decided on 
what standards are appropriate. In these situations the standard setting should be balanced 
against the potential for anti-competitive behaviour – that is, insisting on such uniform 
standards that it is difficult to distinguish providers. Finally, there are issues over 
enforcement. For example, enforcement might involve the appointment of many 
inspectors of bodies charged with enforcing the many rules: how can equity be 
maintained and complaints avoided? 
 
Self-regulation 
This is a less severe regulatory strategy then command and control. It is usually employed 
in relation to professional bodies or associations. Such organisations develop systems of 
rules that they monitor and enforce against their members. This is what the accounting 
profession fought hard to maintain. Generally acceptable accounting principles and later 
accounting standards were developed by professional accounting bodies to avoid 
government control of accounting practice. Some people are not convinced about the 
effectiveness of self regulation, such as the ability of a body to enforce regulation 
directed against some behaviour of its members. For example, can a body overseeing 
honesty in marketing rule against an advertising agent on the basis of its prepared 
marketing material? There are questions of openness, transparency, accountability and 
acceptability of the process. In addition, the rules written by self-regulators may be self-
serving and difficult to be shown to have been contravened. Criticism of this sort has 
been levelled against many accounting standards or principles, For example, the question 
of inventory valuation which in turn requires assumptions about inventory flows (LIFO, 
FIFO etc) led to several thousand permissible techniques of inventory measurement. 
 
Incentive-based regulation 
Although it is usual to think of taxes being used as a penalty to discourage certain 
activities, taxes can be used as a positive incentive. For example, for many years firms in 
Australia were allowed a tax incentive for the purchase of some items of plant and 
equipment or expenditures on research and development or the cost of employment of 
apprentices. These can be general (nation wide) or localised (for items used in certain 
areas or industries). The advantages of such an approach to regulation is ease in 
enforcement (the regulated have to make claims for the incentive) but the disadvantages 
include the difficulty in predicting the effectiveness of the incentive schemes. 
 
Disclosure regulation 
Advocates of the disclosure of information mode of regulation claim it is not heavily 
interventionist. It usually refers to the requirements of product information, such as the 
food value of a pre-packaged food, whether the product is organically produced, 
environmentally friendly, the country of manufacture/origin and so on. Arguments could 
be made that this could also relate to the disclosure of financial information although this 
is not the usual connotation. 
 
Once again, the above are just a few of the many possible regulatory strategies. A full 
understanding of regulation would require a much deeper analysis of the many aspects 
associated with the imposition of regulation. Regulation is used to direct society’s action 
in a way considered the best for that society. Just how this “best” is determined will 
involve many deep questions of power and ideology. “To decide whether a system of 
regulation is good, acceptable, or in need of reform it is necessary to be clear about the 
benchmarks that are relevant to such an evaluation” (Baldwin and Cave, 1996, p 76). A 
typical economists’ reaction would be to associate good regulation with efficiency and 
wealth maximisation. This does not give any indication of ethical efficacy nor the 
appropriateness of the distribution of that wealth. It will be couched in terms of a time 
frame such that what may produce maximum wealth in the short term may cause 
significant environmental damage costs that have to be borne by those in the long term. 
Such analyses may rely on artificial and abstract concepts such as utility, happiness or 
justice. The term hegemony refers to power exercised by one social group over another. 
It is the capacity of a dominant group to exercise control through the willing 
acquiescence of others in society to accept subordinate status by their acceptance of 
cultural, social and political practices and institutions that are unequal and unjust (cf 
Johnston et al, 2000, pp 332-334). The word was originally used in a more radical 
sociological critique but now is used to refer to dominant political and economic 
interests.  Therefore, if wealth distribution is on the basis of wealth maximisation there is 
a given distribution pattern which reflects the past and thus reinforces the interests of an 
economic hegemony. This is part of capitalism. Even though “All over the world there is 
a concern that governments are captured by organised business interests” (Mitchell et al, 
2001, p 3), capitalism emphasises the hegemony of business interests and accountants 
have long tacitly complied with and reinforced this state of affairs. Some even claim that 
accountancy associations have “a long history of opposing reforms, which have sought to 
make corporations accountable” (Puxty, Sikka and Willmott, 1994, quoted in Mitchell et 
al, 2001, p 10). This antisocial conduct, Mitchell et al continue, is “highly visible in 
relation to auditor obligations for detecting/reporting fraud”. The authors continue to 
show how accountants, even those in the largest multinational accounting firms, have 
designed tax schemes to enable their business clients avoid paying taxes5 and also been 
complicit in schemes of money laundering.  
 
The “justification” of an even more cynical approach of business to regulation emanates 
from the University of Chicago law and economics movement. This is that regulation will 
                                                 
5 See also, Mitchell, A, P Sikka, J Christenen, P Morris and S Filling (2002), No Accounting for Tax 
Havens, Basildon, Essex, AABA 
only be obeyed when the costs of disobedience exceed the benefits. Thus, compliance 
becomes a business decision not a societal decision: it is an application of strict cost-
benefit analysis irrespective of the societal implications. There are many instance in the 
daily media of business interests ignoring environmental, health and safety, employment 
and other regulations knowing their non-compliance will attract a fine which they seem 
content to bear. The fine simply becomes a cost of production which can later be 
transferred to the consumer! It is this type of thinking that led to such spectacular 
corporate collapses as Enron, World Com, Parmalaat, HIH and many others (see Clarke, 
Dean and Oliver, 2003).6
 
It is for these and other reasons that many commentators argue that regulation cannot be 
assessed on purely economic grounds. Tinker argues that the current economic hegemony 
- neo-classical economics – cannot fully resolve issues relating to regulations.  
. . . . the inability of the economic-finance literature to say anything 
definitive about the appropriate form of accounting regulation highlights 
the need to augment neo-classical economic analysis with sociopolitical 
considerations (1984, p 55) 
That is, there are much wider social implication of regulation which neo-classical 
economics simply ignores (cannot answer according to its theoretical percepts).  
 
Similarly, Puxty et al have turned to broader theories of the state in order to assess the 
accounting regulation in their four country case study because 
The institutions and process of accounting regulation in different nation-
states cannot be understood independently of the historical and political-
economic contexts of their emergence and development (1987, p 275) 
 
Accounting and Regulation 
 
Over the years commentators have not been unaware of the need to view regulation in a 
broader framework. Some, while recognising the political implications in the process of 
regulation have argued that political considerations be excluded and that accounting 
remain only concerned with measuring the “facts” (Solomons, 1978). In light of the 
above discussion, taken at face value, this sentiment would seem unduly naïve. However, 
over the years it has been the hallmark of much accounting debate: that is, the false belief 
that accounting is value neutral and only concerned with reporting the economic facts! 
 
For most of the twentieth century the accounting profession sought to maintain a regime 
of self regulation. Accounting professional bodies worked hard to avoid the imposition of 
regulation on the discipline. For this reason the professional bodies have attempted to 
develop, first generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and then a conceptual 
framework that would serve as the basis of an accounting theory. Most of the 
                                                 
6 Certainly not all business acts this way – consider this statement in the 2004 HSBC Corporate Social 
Responsibility Report (p 4): 
While our strategy involves growing revenues by meeting customer needs, our goal is not, and never has been, profit at 
any cost. We know that tomorrow’s success depends on the trust we build today. 
 
developments took place in the USA and therefore the approach to regulation was the 
United States approach described above. That is, confidence was maintained in the 
operation of the market with regulation seen as necessary to provide rules to correct the 
slight imperfections in the workings of the market. There is a paradox in that the 
principles, standards and other associated factors were viewed by many as necessary for 
the development of an accounting theory yet accounting practice was seen as only 
needing “minor corrections” to be able to work efficiently (in the market). The search for 
GAAP and a theoretical framework has been a struggle for the discipline and its 
members. Widely differing viewpoints on the necessity and form of regulation have 
resulted in considerable tensions. The involvement of accounting and accountants in 
spectacular corporate collapses and major case of business fraud has ensured the need for 
accounting regulation. Thus, there has been a public interest concern that has created the 
regulation. That is, pressure from various sections of society has demanded regulation. 
 
This was similar to what happened in the 1930s when the US Government (regulation) 
created the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the 1930s. The background to 
this was the economic depression and more particularly the stock market crash which hurt 
many people.  A first reaction would be to suggest that the regulation was a result of 
“public pressure” and hence it was a result of the public interest. However, as Tinker 
(1984) has shown there are diametrically opposite interpretations of this event. Benston 
adopts a free market, economic approach and argues that the legislation damaged 
capitalism (investment) and should be repealed (to permit the free operation of the 
market). His argument adopts a group interest interpretation as he attributes the 
“responsibility for the continuance of securities legislation to self-serving journalists, 
academics, lobbyists, and government officials” (Benston, quoted in Tinker, p 67). He 
believes the legislation should have been repealed in the (private) interests of capitalism. 
On the other hand Merino and Neimark argued that the legislation served to “protect” 
capitalism. They employ a public interest perspective. They agued that there was 
considerable public pressure for the legislation which was “essential to the preservation 
and reproduction of capitalist social relations” (Merino and Neimark, quoted in Tinker , p 
66), that is, the growth in public investing in  US .corporations.7
 
After some heated debate the SEC delegated the development of accounting principles to 
the profession – there was from then self regulation by the profession. However,  
All has not been smooth between the SEC and the private-sector standard 
setter. During the 1940s and early 1950s, when the two parties were 
learning how to relate to each other, the SEC took issue with the 
Committee on Accounting Procedure on several matters: interperiod tax 
allocation (i.e., deferred taxes), all-inclusive v. current-operating-
performance concept of the income statement, stock options, and upward 
asset revaluations. During the 1960s, the SEC succeeded in pressing the 
APB to "narrow the areas of difference" in accounting practice on such 
topics as pensions, extraordinary items, and deferred taxes. (Zeff, 1995, p 
52) 
                                                 
7 By 1940 there were about 4 million investors, by the 1950s this number was about 7 million and by the 
1960s this had grown to 20 million. 
 
The heated debate between the SEC and the accounting professional bodies continued 
throughout the rest of the twentieth century and it raises questions about the 
appropriateness of self regulation. There are specific problems in the discipline of 
accounting and they concern the issue of independence. There are many interrelated 
concerns in respect of independence. Initially accounting firms earned most of their 
income from fees for auditing. The first concern is that the accounting firm is 
investigating its employer so there is an initial conflict of interests. The accounting 
professional bodies through their agencies are supposed to ensure that the possible 
conflict of interests between auditor and client does not arise – that the highest standards 
of “professionalism” are maintained. The professional body comprises members of the 
accounting firms whose work is being monitored and regulated by the professional bodies 
– another potential conflict of interests which is made acute if the accounting firm has 
any power over the professional body. This has clearly been shown to be the case in very 
many instances – the big accounting firms heavily influenced the professional (private) 
regulators. 
 
Many of the problems associated with the conflicts of interest have come to light with 
some of the corporate failures early this century. 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
 
This was especially true in the United States after the dramatic corporate scandals such as 
the Enron, Tyco International and World Com cases. Public pressure on the government 
resulted in the passing of the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor 
Protection Act of 2002, commonly referred to as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (often 
abbreviated as SOX) after the politicians who were instrumental in establishing the Act8. 
The Act established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) which, 
interestingly, is not an agent of the government but an independent nonprofit corporation. 
However, there are many requirements that ensure the PCAOB works with and reports to 
the SEC. 
 
Section 103 of the Act states that: 
The Board shall:  
(1) register public accounting firms;  
(2) establish, or adopt, by rule, "auditing, quality control, ethics, independence, and other 
standards relating to the preparation of audit reports for issuers;"  
(3) conduct inspections of accounting firms;  
(4) conduct investigations and disciplinary proceedings, and impose appropriate 
sanctions;  
(5) perform such other duties or functions as necessary or appropriate;  
(6) enforce compliance with the Act, the rules of the Board, professional standards, and 
the securities laws relating to the preparation and issuance of audit reports and the 
obligations and liabilities of accountants with respect thereto;  
(7) set the budget and manage the operations of the Board and the staff of the Board. 
 
                                                 
8 The full Act can be accessed at: http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/gwbush/sarbanesoxley072302.pdf 
Thus, despite the “official status” of the PCAOB it means that the government has 
become involved with regulating (some) accounting activities. In fact, as paragraph (6) 
states, the PCAOB is required to be involved in regulation, most specifically, auditing 
standards (especially those relating to internal control procedures). It is also interesting to 
note that despite the Act, in October 2005, a survey by the Wall Street Journal (21 
October 2005) found that 55% of US investors (77% males between the ages of 45 to 54) 
believed that financial and accounting regulations governing publicly held companies are 
too lenient. 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act resulted from public pressure and is therefore an example of the 
public interest approach to regulation. Similar pressures were in place prior to the passage 
of the US Securities Act in 1934 which resulted in (amongst other things) the creation of 
the SEC and this seems to add weight to the Merino and Neimark interpretation rather 
than that of Benston described above. In addition, Sarbanes-Oxley was a blow to the 
accounting profession’s extensive efforts, since the passage of the Securities Acts of the 
1930s, to maintain a regime of self regulation. 
 
Enforcing Regulation  
 
A criticism often levelled at self-regulation concerns enforcement. Professional 
accounting bodies have disciplinary committees designed to enforce the relevant 
regulations. However, how effective is this process? There are issues of politics and 
power. For example, would the accounting bodies have taken action against a major 
accounting firm if there was evidence of some of its member acting inappropriately? 
Some suggest had they done so there may have been fewer corporate scandals.  
 
There are various approaches that have been used to ensure enforcement of regulations. 
These vary from compliance approaches to deterrence approaches. With the former the 
aim is to encourage conformity with the regulation; with the latter, prosecutions are used 
to deter future infractions. The US approach to accounting standards is said to be rules 
based so its emphasis is on deterrence. In other countries such as Australia, and the 
position adopted by the International Accounting Standards Board, the approach is said to 
be principles based so the emphasis is to ensure users can theoretically justify use of an 
accounting technique – does it comply with the intention behind the regulation? 
However, the issue is not that simple because if a system is rules based then it is 
important to have rules that are sufficiently precise, extensive and understandable. This 
may well be why the US has so many accounting standards and why there is an emphasis 
on standards education! 
 
Deterrence approaches are said to be more direct and definite and more effective in 
eliminating errant conduct. They are “tougher” than compliance approaches and it is 
therefore more rational to comply. Compliance approaches are, it is argued more 
susceptible to capture and a lack of sufficient enforcement resources. On the other hand, 
compliance proponents argue it is more efficient and less costly because the process of 
prosecution is extremely costly. It is also more flexible and less confrontational which in 
turn encourages compliance. Ayres and Braithwaite have suggested that “The trick of 
successful regulation is to establish a synergy between punishment and prosecution” 
(quoted in Baldwin and Cave, 1999, p 99). 
 
From the comments by the then Chairman of the SEC, Harvey Pitt, it is clear that in the 
US there is the intention of a deterrence approach as he has suggested that it is clear that 
the SEC “should be empowered to perform investigations, bring disciplinary proceedings, 
publicize results, restrict individuals and firms from auditing public companies” (Pitt, 
2002). 
 
Regulation, Research and Theory 
 
The subject of regulation is very wide ranging and is very important. There are very 
many viewpoints as to the purpose, the need for and the operation of regulation. Not only 
can regulation be viewed as market failure it can also be seen as “theory failure”. In 
accounting the profession strenuously pursued a search for an underlying theoretical 
structure through GAAP, standards and a conceptual framework. Had the profession been 
successful there would have been less need for the intervention of the state in regulating 
the discipline; so, in this sense it is the failure of those in the discipline of accounting to 
provide a theory that has necessitated the intervention – or at least to the extent that there 
has been. Economic purists argue that there should be no need for regulation as the 
market can operate to ensure the fair distribution of resources. There is a paradox in the 
free market argument as history has shown that considerable regulation has been 
necessary to ensure that the market can operate reasonably efficiently9. 
 
Both these positions – “theory failure” and totally free markets – are simplistic in that 
they ignore the broader social setting of the discipline. Once again, history demonstrates 
that no amount of theory or regulation will prevent some people engaging in 
inappropriate activities. For example, complex income tax legislation does not prevent 
tax evasion schemes being devised by some accountants. Accountants will still be 
involved in corporate fraud and collapses. Accounting is a social discipline and cannot be 
isolated from the broader implications of those who prepare accounting information and 
those who use it. Very simply stated, there will always be ill-intentioned accountants and 
users of accounting information who will not act in the interest of society. This of course 
is true of most professions – for example, medical doctors taking drugs, lawyers devising 
criminal schemes to avoid justice, engineers using inferior materials to cut costs of 
projects and many other similar situations. Therefore, whether we like it or not, societies 
have seen fit to impose some safeguards against such actions – professional and other 
sanctions – in the form of regulation.  
 
With rapid societal changes brought on by advances in information technology and the 
pressures of globalisation the need for systems safeguarding social interests has become 
more acute and there have been greater demands from the public. This would suggest a 
reversion to the regulation for the public interest motive. However, the situation is more 
                                                 
9 This is emphatically demonstrated in the regulation of employment introduced by the Australian 
Government in 2005 where, for example, there is a highly complex system of employer fines if they 
contravene how the Government sees the operation of “free” market! 
complex and, whereas there are many instance of the public interest motive for regulation 
there are also many examples of all the other approaches described earlier in this paper – 
group interest, private interest and for institutional reasons. In fact, it is difficult to 
discern which approach is relevant to much of the regulation as it seems to be a 
combination of many approaches. 
 
There is also difficulty in determining the public interest. So, while the AICPA Code of 
Professional Conduct describes it in general welfare terms10 (a public interest approach) 
one official of that same body argues that the public interest of the AICPA should 
emphasise investors and creditors in capital markets (a neo-classical economic approach) 
(Baker, 2005 pp 693-695). However, there is little doubt that any regulation is a political 
process but there are very different interpretations of what this means. Watts and 
Zimmerman (1978) in examining the need for accounting regulation (standards) argued, 
some time ago, that this political process worked to serve the interests of individual and 
groups of academics.  As Tinker states, “academics are reduced to intellectual 
mercenaries who advocate greater regulation to maximize their own wealth” (1984, p 59). 
Thus, Watts and Zimmerman adopted a private interest or group interest approach to 
regulation.  
 
Irrespective of the approach adopted there is little doubt that regulation will be the result 
of the interplay of political forces. How these are manifest will vary from situation to 
situation. These forces have, over the years, impacted on and will continue to directly 
influence the practice of accounting through the various forms of regulation that have 






                                                 
10 Section 53.02: “The public interest is defined as the collective well-being of the community of people 
and institutions the profession serves” 
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